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I. Introduction
Since the 1970s, the federal government’s jurisdiction over crime has
vastly increased.1 Relying on an expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, Congress criminalized a variety of activities, broadening the scope
of federal crime into areas historically left to the States.2 Today, federal
criminal laws act as a supplement to many state criminal laws.
Consequently, a significant amount of criminal conduct is subject to federal
as well as state prosecution, which increases the potential for successive or
dual prosecutions.3
1. See Greg Hollon, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties Hangover, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 499, 499 (1996) (explaining how Congress has relied on an
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause to criminalize “a variety of activities
traditionally considered to be purely state matters.”).
2. See James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The
Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1795, 1796 (1994) (“The Commerce Clause has become, in recent years, the
foundation for an expanding federal criminal jurisdiction over intrastate activities, on the
theory that such activities ‘affect interstate commerce.’”).
3. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70
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The federalization of crime has brought about significant changes in
the way state and federal officials implement the criminal laws.4
Historically, the federal government’s involvement in crime was confined
to enumerated areas of special federal concern.5 Federal and state law
enforcement operated in distinct fields and had little interaction with one
another—a stark contrast to today’s reality of concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction over many crimes.6 Concurrent criminal jurisdiction has
resulted in extensive interaction between state and federal authorities within
the criminal process.7 This federal-state collaboration has been described as
the “age of ‘cooperative federalism’, where the Federal and State
governments are waging a united front against many types of criminal
activity.”8 While cooperation between the two sovereigns can have many
benefits, this Note will focus on an undesirable consequence of the
federalization of crime and cooperative federalism—the cross-designation
of prosecutors.9
A cross-designated prosecutor is usually a state prosecutor crossdesignated as a Special Assistant United States Attorney (“SAUSA”) to
prosecute federal crimes.10 The prosecutor retains his position as a state
prosecutor while acting as a SAUSA, effectively placing the prosecutorial
power of both sovereigns in a single government actor. 11 This
S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 738 n.7 (1997) (noting that “federalization of criminal law increases
opportunities for successive federal prosecutions . . . .”).
4. See Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7
(discussing the change in the criminal process brought about by the federalization of crime
and noting that the relations between federal and state are cooperative rather than
independent).
5. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98
W. VA. L. Rev. 789, 790 (1996) (“The United States Constitution granted relatively little
criminal law enforcement authority to the newly created federal government . . . .”).
6. See Braun, supra note 4, at 8 (explaining that the federalization of crime and the
increasing cooperative interaction between federal and state law enforcement efforts are
closely related).
7. Id.
8. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1964).
9. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 168–69 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Of
course, cooperation between federal and state authorities in law enforcement is to be desired
and encouraged . . . .”).
10. Federal prosecutors can also be cross-designated to conduct state prosecutions but
this occurs less frequently.
11. Victoria L. Killion, No Points for the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role of Special
Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 789, 791 (2009) (“Additionally, state prosecutors may be ‘cross-designated’
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centralization of power is the very danger that the Framers sought to protect
against.12 The concentration of power and authority possessed by a crossdesignated prosecutor poses a substantial danger to the liberties and
interests of criminal defendants. This danger has been often overlooked or
disregarded in favor of more efficient crime control measures. The desire of
politicians and law enforcement personnel to appear “tough on crime” has
placed efficiency concerns at the forefront of the criminal process while
pushing attention to the individual liberties of the accused into the
background.
Many have argued that cross designation is just a part of a bigger
problem in our criminal justice system: allowing dual and successive
prosecutions during the age of cooperative federalism. However, courts
have summarily rejected broad challenges to dual or successive
prosecutions.13 The purpose of this Note is to narrow the focus of the
argument to issues arising when the same prosecutor is allowed to use the
same evidence to prosecute a defendant in separate sovereigns. Addressing
this problem and implementing measures to curtail its practice will afford
criminal defendants protection from abuses of prosecutorial power and
manipulation of the criminal process.
The cross-designated prosecutor has been described as a “doubleedged sword.”14 The assurance of more efficient, enhanced attacks on crime
is moderated by the acceptance of responsibility in preventing unfair and
costly multiple prosecutions.15 So long as the prosecution uses the
resources, procedures, and investigative tools gained through the joint
venture fairly and properly, there is no cause for concern. However, the
very existence of this model of prosecution presents an invitation to
manipulate the criminal process to gain an advantage over the accused. As
one commentator observed, “. . . cross-designation—with its sharing of
cooperative witnesses, mutual disclosure of grand jury testimony and
general enhancement of prosecutive cases by cooperating sovereigns—the
as SAUSAs, allowing them to retain their positions while trying cases in federal court.”).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing
the importance of maintaining proper checks and balances and separation of power within
the government in order to avoid a concentration of power that would threaten the rights of
the people).
13. See infra note 25.
14. Terry J. Knoepp & Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Creation of the Cross Designated
Prosecutor Concept, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 155, 174 (1976–78).
15. Id.
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defendants can be placed in the unfortunate position of potentially
defending two successive cases essentially produced by the same
prosecutors, who are cross-designated and thus given two bites of the same
apple.”16 Because of the great potential for abuse that accompanies this
centralization of prosecutorial power, I argue that a cross-designated
prosecutor should not be allowed to prosecute the same criminal defendant
in separate jurisdictions.
Part I of this Note will focus on the present state of the criminal justice
system, specifically the internal policies of the Department of Justice and
State Attorneys General allowing individual prosecutors to represent both
the Federal and State governments against a single defendant. Part II
describes the various harms resulting from this system, specifically those
undermining fundamental principles of federalism, those threatening the
civil liberties of individual defendants, and those threatening the efficiency
and legitimacy of the Court in the criminal justice system. Part III
introduces proposed remedies to the system, with suggestions for Federal
and State Executive Branches, Federal and State Legislatures, and
individual defendants seeking judicial redress for those harms that can arise
in criminal proceedings.
II. The Centralized Prosecution System
A. Appointment of SAUSAs
In response to federal budget cuts, the Department of Justice has been
appointing an ever-increasing number of SAUSAs to assist with their
caseload.17 No federal or state statutory authority currently exists that
authorizes the creation of a cross-designated prosecutor position.18 Instead,
a cross-designated prosecutor is created by the utilization of the Attorney
General’s appointment powers.19 Federal law authorizes the appointment
of SAUSAs to assist U.S. Attorneys in preparation and prosecution of
16. See Joel Cohen, “Cross-Designation” of Prosecutors: They Shouldn’t Have it
Both Ways, NAT’L L.J. 1, 36 (1987).
17. See Christie Thompson, To Cope with Sequester, Justice Department Staffs
Unpaid
Attorneys,
PROPUBLICA
(June
28,
2013,
8:00
AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/to-cope-with-sequester-justice-department-staffs-unpaidattorneys (describing unpaid SAUSAs as a practical solution to growing budget pressure).
18. .
See Knoepp & Miller, supra note 14, at 157.
19. Id.
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federal criminal cases.20 Once appointed, a SAUSA has the same power and
authority as an Assistant United States Attorney.21 A state or local
prosecutor can be “cross-designated” as a SAUSA, thus allowing that
person to retain his or her position as a state prosecutor while trying cases
in federal court.22 This practice allows for dual or successive prosecutions
in state and federal jurisdictions by a single prosecutor.23 Moreover, it
allows for simultaneous federal and state prosecutions by a single
prosecutor as that prosecutor has the ability to bring charges in both
jurisdictions.24
B. Challenges to Cross-Designated Prosecutors Have Been Unsuccessful
Due to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
Dual and successive prosecutions have been frequently challenged as
violative of a defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.25 These
claims have been largely unsuccessful because of the dual sovereignty
doctrine.26 The doctrine stems from the common law notion that crime is
an offense against the sovereign.27 The premise of the dual sovereignty
doctrine is that state and federal jurisdictions are two separate sovereignties

20. See 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) (2012) (“The Attorney General may appoint attorneys to
assist United States attorneys when the public interest so requires . . . .”).
21. See AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., Cross-Designation & Federal Firearms
Laws: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know 5 (2003) (explaining chain of command of
SAUSAs).
22. Id.
23. See United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182–83 (noting the “troubling”
circumstances present, including that the same state prosecutor was responsible for both
state and federal prosecutions).
24. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1062 (explaining that under our
federal system there can be simultaneous federal and State prosecutions against a defendant).
25. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 (1985); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 315–16 (1978); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189–90
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122 (1959); United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d
1310, 1312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831 (1989); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d
561, 564–65 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Humphrey v. United States, 481 U.S. 1006
(1987); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980).
26. Id.
27. Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 290 (1992).
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that derive their power from different sources.28 Thus, where a single act
violates both state and federal criminal prohibitions, the act gives rise to
two separate offenses: one against the state and one against the United
States.29 This doctrine justifies reprosecution by state authorities of
defendants tried before federal courts, reprosecution of federal authorities
of defendants tried before state courts, and reprosecution by state
authorities of defendants tried before the courts of another state.30 The
doctrine also allows concurrent prosecution in state and federal court.31 The
dual sovereignty doctrine bars challenges to dual or successive prosecutions
even when a cross-designated prosecutor conducts both prosecutions.
1. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
The dual sovereignty doctrine has been long embraced by the Supreme
Court, beginning with United States v. Lanza.32 In Lanza, the Court relied
on the dual sovereignty doctrine and held that, “an act denounced as a crime
by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and
dignity of both and may be punished by each.”33 The doctrine was further
solidified in Bartkus v. Illinois34 and Abbate v. United States.35 In Bartkus,
a federal jury acquitted Bartkus of robbing a federally insured bank. 36
Disappointed in their failure to obtain a conviction, the federal authorities
instigated reprosecution of Bartkus by Illinois authorities under a state
robbery statute.37 The federal authorities prepared the state case, guided the
state prosecution, and postponed the sentencing of Bartkus’ alleged coperpetrators until they testified against Bartkus at the state trial.38 In
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 281–82.
31. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Likewise
under our federal system there can be simultaneous federal and State prosecutions where
similar or identical offenses under the two systems of law are committed as the result of
particular conduct on the part of a defendant.”).
32. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
33. .
Id. at 382.
34. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
35. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
36. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121, 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 164–67.
38. Id.
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January 1954, after being tried in state court on substantially the same facts,
he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.39 The Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction, relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, and held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit prosecution by state
authorities of a person who had been previously subjected to federal
prosecution for the same offense.40 That same day, the Court heard Abbate
v. United States, which challenged the propriety of allowing a federal
prosecution for conspiracy to destroy federal property following a state
prosecution for conspiracy to destroy the property of another.41 The Court
reasoned that because the state and federal governments are separate
sovereigns, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit prosecution by
federal authorities of a person who had been subjected previously to state
prosecution for the same offense.42
2. An “Exception” to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
In Bartkus, the Court suggested in dicta an exception to the dual
sovereignty doctrine: the dual sovereignty doctrine would not bar
successive prosecutions where “the state prosecution was a sham and a
cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in essential fact another federal
prosecution,” and vice versa.43 The Bartkus Court did not specify the level
of intergovernmental collusion or cooperation necessary to fall within the
exception, nor has it done so since.44 Indeed, as Justice Brennan’s dissent
points out, the facts of Bartkus itself suggest the difficulty of establishing
the exception.45 The exception has been described as “illusory” while many
jurisdictions have questioned whether the exception exists at all.46 Courts
39. Id.
40. Id. at 138 (majority opinion).
41. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 188–89 (1959).
42. Id. at 194–95.
43. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123–24 (1959).
44. See Thomas White, Limitations Imposed on the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine by
Federal and State Governments, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 173, 183 (2011).
45. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot see how there can
be more complete federal participation in a state prosecution than there was in this
case . . . . If this state conviction is not overturned, then, as a practical matter, there will be
no restraints on the use of state machinery by federal officers to bring what is in effect a
second federal prosecution.”).
46. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 296 (“The sham prosecution exception is more than
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have made clear that mere “cooperation between prosecutorial
sovereignties” is insufficient to meet the exception.47 This is true even
when the circumstances of the case strongly suggest a sham prosecution
such as where: (1) state sovereigns requested federal prosecution, (2) the
initial sovereign turned over all of its evidence to the second, and (3) cross
designations of state officials as federal officials were made.48
Many have discussed the ineffectiveness of the exception and its utter
failure to prevent unjust outcomes.49 Around the time the dual sovereignty
doctrine was established, the risk of successive federal-state prosecutions
was not a substantial concern as the practice was very rare.50 However, that
changed with the dramatic expansion of federal criminal law. Before the
federalization of criminal law, reality supported the dual sovereignty
doctrine’s portrayal of two independent sovereigns.51 Today, cooperation
between the federal and state governments is a regular and, in some areas—
such as the execution of criminal firearms and narcotics laws—pervasive
feature of the modern American criminal justice system.52
C. Cross-Designated Prosecutors Are a Result of the Transformation of
Our Criminal Justice System

narrow, it is illusory.”); see also United States v. Patterson, 809 F.2d 244, 247 n.2 (5th Cir.
1987) (noting that the Bartkus Court “did not squarely address the issue of whether, if
substantiated by the record, a ‘sham’ situation would constitute an exception to the dual
sovereignty doctrine.”).
47. There was extensive cooperation in Bartkus but the Court declined to question
whether it was a “sham prosecution.” Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bernhardt,
831 F.2d 181, 182–83 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Angelton, 314 F.3d 767, 773–74 (5th
Cir. 2002).
48. See White, supra note 44, at 186.
49. See, e.g., Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal
Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 1309 (1997); see also David L. Lane, Twice Bitten: Denial of the Right to Counsel in
Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1869, 1882 (2009)
(describing the “sham prosecution” exception as flawed or nonexistent).
50. See Braun, supra note 4, at 6 (“For Alphonse Bartkus and Louis Abbate, the
danger was all too real, but the practice was still rare.”).
51. Id. at 7 (explaining that before the federalization of crime, state and federal law
enforcement officials operated in separate and distinct fields with little or no interaction).
52. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 297 (discussing the joint efforts of state and federal
law enforcement in the “war on drugs”).
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1. The Federalization of Crime and the Resulting System of Cooperative
Federalism
The ever-popular political desire to appear tough on crime has “fueled
an enormous growth in the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction
over crime and in the resources allotted to federal law enforcement and
prosecution.”53 Since the 1960s, Congress has passed sweeping crime
control measures, resulting in concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over
many crimes. Thus, the landscape of the criminal justice system
transformed from two sovereigns enforcing their criminal laws separately
and independently to increasing collaboration between federal-state
officials acting together to enforce the criminal laws.54 This practice of
national, state, and local governments interacting cooperatively and
collectively to solve common problems has been termed “cooperative
federalism.” 55 The tendency, particularly in large urban areas, was to
formalize collaborative relationships between federal, state and local
agencies through joint task forces and a variety of special programs.56 The
practice of cross-designating prosecutors began as a result of cooperative
federalism.57
The federalization of crime and emergence of cooperative federalism
has significantly weakened the justifications for allowing dual or successive
prosecutions. Many have argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine has no
place in the age of cooperative federalism because the rationale behind the
dual sovereignty doctrine can only stand if the two sovereigns are actually
separate and independent.58 Indeed, in other areas of criminal law—such as
53. Hollon, supra note 1, at 537.
54. See Braun, supra note 4, at 7 (explaining how the proliferation of federal criminal
legislation has changed the way the criminal law is executed by state and federal officials).
55. Id. at 8.
56. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism,
34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 397 (2006) (describing the collaborative relationships involved in
joint task forces).
57. Nora V. Demleitner, The Federalization of Crimes and Sentencing, 11 FED.
SENT’G REP. 123, 125 (1998) (“Frequently state and federal prosecutors . . . are crossdesignated to allow them to work in both systems.”).
58. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 296–97; Braun, supra note 4, at 71–72; see also
Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in
Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1540–50 (1967); Ray C. Stoner, Double Jeopardy and
Dual Sovereignty: A Critical Analysis, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 946, 955–58 (1970); see
also United States v. Grimes 641 F.2d 96, 101–104 (1981); see also United States v. All
Assets G.P.S., 66 F.3d 483,496–99 (1995).
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compelled testimony and sharing illegally obtained evidence—the courts
have authorized a retreat from strict adherence to the dual sovereignty
doctrine. 59
Because there have been numerous works exploring the implications
that cooperative federalism has on dual sovereignty, I will not be focusing
on cooperative federalism and dual sovereignty as a whole. The focus of
this Note is much narrower and more amenable to resolution: the harm that
arises when the structural protections of sovereign independence become
meaningless when federal and state power unite in one prosecutor.
III. Dangers Inherent in Centralized Prosecution
A. Prosecutorial Power
In our criminal justice system, the prosecutor possesses broad
discretion and wide-ranging powers.60 No public official has a greater
direct impact on the individual citizen than the prosecutor in a criminal
case.61 As one scholar stated, “overreaching and the resulting miscarriages
of justice are dangers built into the very structure of governmental power
and prosecutions in criminal cases.”62 Another explained, “[c]oncurrent
jurisdiction due to the federalization of criminal law introduces a potential
for prosecutorial abuse that was not an area of concern when crime was
primarily a locally regulated phenomenon.”63 The expansion of crimes and
resulting increases in punishment has effectively transferred the power to
make and adjudicate laws to prosecutors.64 The overlap of federal and state
59. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964)
(noting an interaction of state and federal officials in a “united front against many types of
criminal activity,” the Court acknowledged that the institutional interests safeguarded by a
system of dual sovereignties had been partially superseded by a structure of cooperative
federalism); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960) (outlining the
silver-platter doctrine and finding that evidence that is illegally obtained by state law
enforcement officers is no longer admissible in a federal prosecution).
60. See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double
Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 887 (1998).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 957.
63. See Heller, supra note 49, at 1313.
64. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004) (“The law-on-the-street—the law that
determines who goes to prison and for how long—is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by
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criminal laws and procedures creates even more opportunity for abuse of
discretion on the part of the cross-designated prosecutor.65 The practice of
cross-designation affords the prosecutor unfettered authority to make
charging decisions, strike plea deals, impose sentences, and manipulate
otherwise independent sovereigns in securing a conviction.66 Cross
designation has been criticized as resulting in the manipulation of federal
and state prosecutions, making one prosecution a “mere subterfuge” for the
other.67
Most of the challenges involving cross-designated prosecutors have
been double jeopardy claims premised on the Bartkus exception to the dual
sovereignty doctrine.68 Every circuit to consider the issue has held that the
cross-designation of a state district attorney as a federal official to assist or
even to conduct a federal prosecution does not by itself bring a case within
the Bartkus exception.69 Even when the facts suggest substantial control of
one sovereign over the other by use of a cross-designated prosecutor, courts
have declined to apply the exception.70
B. Centralized Prosecution Is Inconsistent with Principles of Federalism

legislators or judges.”).
65. See Heller, supra note 49, at 1326.
66. Id.
67. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395 n.15
(1992).
68. See United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891,
893 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674, 677 (11th Cir. 1992).
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.1991) (noting
that the state prosecuted at the request of federal authorities; federal agents testified and sat
at the state prosecutor’s table; federal evidence provided to the state; federal agent prepared
key state witnesses; SAUSAs salary as federal prosecutor paid by the state); United States v.
Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir.1990) (noting that DEA was actively involved in the state
investigation and arrest; state prosecutor was designated as SAUSA for federal prosecution);
United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674, 677 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that after the state
court judge granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the state prosecutor, Dirks,
filed a nolle prosse and federal authorities indicted defendant and appointed Dirks as a
SAUSA for purposes of federal prosecution). But cf. United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp.
666 (W.D. Va. 1991) (finding that there was substantial control of one sovereign over the
other by use of a cross-designated SAUSA).
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The model of centralized prosecution that results from crossdesignating prosecutors is inconsistent with the principles of federalism
upon which our Nation was founded.71 The Framers divided authority
between the federal and state governments for the benefit of the American
people.72 This was to “prevent any distortion of the balance of power that in
turn would subject the people to a tyrannous federal government.”73 In
allocating power between the state and federal governments and placing
sovereignty in the hands of the people, the Framers were not only motivated
by a size-of-government concern, but also a concern with protecting
individual liberty.74 Government officials became representatives or agents
of the people—the government’s power derived from the sovereignty of the
people.75 The rationale for separating the government into independent
federal and state spheres is explained in James Madison’s The Federalist
No. 51:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.76

The Supreme Court echoed this in Gregory v. Ashcroft,77 reasoning
that in the same way that “separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
71. See Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed
Constitutional Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
851, 854 (2006) (explaining that federalism refers to the sharing of power between two
levels of government).
72. See id. at 856 (“This division of authority between the state and federal
governments, with the latter enjoying only limited, enumerated powers, was not created for
the benefit of the states but for the benefit of the American people.”).
73. Id.
74. See Garry, supra note 71, at 852 (noting that the Framers believed that federalism
would help ensure individual liberty by limiting and monitoring the power of the
government).
75. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1435–
36 (1987).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
77. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (finding that Congressional
interference with the state’s decision to establish qualifications for judges upsets the usual
constitutional balance of federal and state powers).
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excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.”78 Hence, the Federalists consciously designed a
dual-agency governance structure in which each set of government agents
would have incentives to monitor and enforce the other’s compliance with
the Constitution’s protections of individual rights and liberties.79 Thus,
federalism promotes limited government and limited government, in turn,
inhibits oppression of the powerless by making it more difficult for the
powerful to act.80
1. Centralized Prosecution Results in a Breakdown of Federalism and its
Protections
By diffusing power and limiting government in a manner analogous to
the separation of powers, federalism is one of the Constitution’s structural
protections of liberty.81 As one scholar explains:
A diverse and decentralized governmental structure divided between the
layers of state, local and nation, offers an array of benefits, the most
compelling of which is the protection of individual liberty. The
Constitution’s embodiment of the structural principles of federalism is
designed not just to create a workable government but to create one that
protects individual rights. Federalism works with . . . the separation of
powers to produce a system with two different levels of checks and
balances: one existing between the national and state governments, and
the other between the three branches of federal government. This system
reflects what Madison called the Constitution’s “double security” for
individual rights.82

Federalism was intended to give the governments, state and national,
incentives to win the sovereign people’s affections by “monitoring and
challenging the other’s misdeeds.”83 However when the state and federal
government unite to prosecute a single criminal defendant, there is no one
78. Id.
79. See Amar, supra note 75, at 1427.
80. See id.
81. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (explaining that the separation of
state and federal government into separate spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural
protections of liberty).
82. Garry, supra note 71, at 873–74.
83. Amar, supra note 75, at 1450.
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to challenge the other’s misdeeds. Thus, the lack of any meaningful check
substantially increases the potential for abuse of power and unconstitutional
infringement upon a defendant’s rights.
“Far from seeking to create an indivisible central organ to wield all
national power, the Federalists labored to divide power among distinct
agencies.”84 By diluting the power of the centralized national government,
federalism effectively limits opportunities for abuse. The breakdown of
federalism occurring as a result of cooperative federalism and, more
specifically, cross-designated prosecutors, has dire consequences for the
criminally accused.
To the Framers, “the primary safeguards against government tyranny
were architectural.”85 Infringements on liberty caused by a potentially
tyrannical national government could best be prevented by state
governments standing “ready to rally their citizens and lead them into
opposition.”86 But overreaching by one government cannot be prevented by
the other when the two are joined together. This concentration of power—
concentration of both state and federal prosecutorial power in a single
prosecutor—was exactly what the Framers intended to prevent. This is
evidenced by James Madison’s The Federalist No. 47 where he stated,
“[t]he accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands . . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”87 In separating and dividing
power, either horizontally or vertically, the Federalists believed that
individual liberties would be protected by vesting power in different sets of
agents who will have personal incentives to observe and enforce limitations
on each other’s powers.88
Federalism and its constitutionally guaranteed protection of liberty is
completely destroyed when federal and state prosecutorial powers are
vested in an individual government actor. Absent federalism’s protection
from a centralized governmental authority, the individual criminal

84. Id. at 1442.
85. Garry, supra note 71, at 875–76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id.
87. See Amar, supra note 75, at 1442 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47) (this refers to
the separation of powers, but the argument for federalism is analogous).
88. Id. at 1427 (“Guided by emerging principles of agency law and organization
theory, the Federalists consciously designed a dual-agency governance structure in which
each set of government agents would have incentives to monitor and enforce the other’s
compliance with the corporate charter established by the People of America.”).
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defendant is extremely vulnerable to a number of abuses and violation of
rights.89
2. This Breakdown In Federalism Impermissibly Increases A CrossDesignated Prosecutor’s Power and Discretion
In many American jurisdictions, the prosecutor is the criminal justice
system.90 Prosecutors effectively make the law, enforce it against particular
individuals, and adjudicate their guilt and resulting sentences.91 Former
U.S. Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice, Robert H. Jackson,
explained the potential for abuse inherent in prosecutorial power:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than
any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. . . . If the
prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose
his defendants. . . . It is in this realm in which the prosecutor picks some
person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group
of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest
danger of abuse of prosecutorial power lies. It is here that law
enforcement becomes personal.92

The model of centralized prosecution that occurs by the utilization of
cross-designated prosecutors lacks any meaningful checks that would
prevent these abuses. Unlike the system envisioned by the Framers where
the Constitution provides “double security” for individual rights, neither
federalism nor the separation of powers principle provides any checks upon
this power. When the State and Federal governments join forces, as they do
in cross-designated prosecutors, the “two sovereigns in effect act as one
sovereign; that they represent two governments becomes insignificant.”93
89. See Garry, supra note 71, at 855 (emphasizing federalism as a structural protection
necessary for the preservation of democracy and individual rights).
90. See Erik Luna & Marianna Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1415 (2010).
91. See id.
92. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General of United States, The Federal Prosecutor
(Apr. 1, 1940), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speechesarticles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/the-federal-prosecutor/.
93. Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1207 (1995) (“When two
jurisdictions join forces in this way, the reasons for granting each sovereign the power to
enforce its laws disappear. The two sovereignties in effect act as one sovereign; that they
represent two governments becomes insignificant.”).
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The concentration of such power and authority in a single actor renders
federalism’s protective structure meaningless—a single government actor
cannot serve as a check upon his or herself.
The separation of powers principle is an ineffective check on
prosecutors as well.94 As part of the executive branch of government,
prosecutors have the power and the duty to enforce the laws.95 In theory,
the judiciary and legislative branches are to serve as checks on
prosecutorial power, however, in practice, prosecutors have essentially been
left to regulate themselves.96 Depending solely on prosecutors to exercise
self-restraint is problematic. Insulating a prosecutor’s actions from judicial
review can lead to violations of citizens’ rights through the arbitrary, or
worse, vindictive exercise of authority.97 Nevertheless, courts have
consistently deferred to the expertise of prosecutors in declining to question
their motives for charging and other important prosecutorial decisions. 98
Likewise, in an effort to give prosecutors the freedom and independence to
enforce the law, the legislative branch has also been wary to hamper the
prosecutorial process.99 In 1975, a proposal for federal legislation dealing
with successive prosecutions in the federal system failed because it was
thought that the Petite Policy (discussed below) adequately dealt with the
problem.100
The underlying dangers that arise out of the practice of crossdesignating prosecutors extend much further than the potential for dual or
successive prosecutions. The sham exception to dual sovereignty was meant
to address the breakdown of federalism that comes with the elimination of
the “dual” aspect of dual sovereignty.101 In upholding the dual sovereignty
doctrine the Supreme Court explained, “Bartkus and Abbate rest on the
basic structure of our federal system, in which States and the National
94. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 14–15 (1st ed. 2009).
95. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
96. See id. (noting that self-regulation is either nonexistent or inadequate).
97. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U.L.Q. 713, 732–33 (1999).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARAH SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 772 (2d ed. 1993).
101. See United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 670 (W.D. Va. 1991) (noting the
emphasis the Bartkus court placed on federalism).
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Governments are separate political communities. State and Federal
Governments [derive] power from different sources, each from the organic
law that established it.”102 In discussing dual sovereignty the Supreme
Court stated that each independent sovereign is “exercising its own
sovereignty, not that of the other.”103 To fit within the exception, the
defendant must show that one sovereign was so dominated or controlled by
the actions of the other that officials had little or no independent volition in
their proceedings.104 When a state prosecutor is cross-designated as a
SAUSA and is involved in both federal and state prosecutions against a
single defendant, it is difficult to conceive how that prosecutor, as a
representative of both sovereigns, can act with independent volition. The
cross-designated prosecutor is representative of both the state and federal
governments. Thus, the interests of both sovereigns are unavoidably
weighed when making decisions that can unjustly affect a criminal
defendant.
The centralization of power that occurs with the breakdown of
federalism to which Bartkus alluded has arisen with cross-designated
prosecutors.105 The dual sovereignty doctrine, which is nothing more than a
legal fiction, cannot justify a cross-designated prosecutor instigating
proceedings against the same defendant in separate sovereigns. When the
two sovereigns are no longer acting as separate and distinct entities, the
justifications for the dual sovereignty doctrine fall flat.106 Although the
courts to consider challenges involving cross-designated prosecutors have
failed to find sufficient collusion, the facts of these cases (discussed below)
strongly suggest the existence of such collusion. When the power of two
102. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994). However, federal courts have
rejected applicability of the exception when prosecutions in which (1) state sovereigns
requested federal prosecution, (2) the initial sovereign turned over all of its evidence to the
second, and (3) cross designations of state officials as federal officials were made. See
United States v. Angelton, 221 F. Supp.2d 696, 713–20 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
105. See Heller, supra note 49, at 1313 (“Concurrent jurisdiction due to the
federalization of criminal law introduces a potential for prosecutorial abuse that was not an
area of concern when crime was primarily a locally regulated phenomenon.”).
106. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155–56 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I
have been shown nothing in the history of our Union, in the writings of its Founders, or
elsewhere, to indicate that individual rights deemed essential by both State and Nation were
to be lost through the combined operations of the two governments.”).
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governments becomes centralized in one cross-designated prosecutor, it
results in harms to the accused and to our criminal justice system. 107
a. Harms to the Individual Defendant
Not only does the model of centralized prosecution fail to provide
“double security” for the individual rights of the accused—it fails to
provide any security or protection whatsoever. From the perspective of the
accused, facing federal and state charges concurrently or consecutively is
an enormous burden.108 If those proceedings are strung out over a lengthy
period of time the defendant is forced to live in a continuing state of
uncertainty.109
The “inherent inequality” between prosecutors and
defendants has intensified with the federalization of crime and the use of
cross-designated prosecutors.110 The prosecutor’s investigating, charging,
convicting, and sentencing powers have expanded, giving the prosecutor an
unfair advantage over the individual defendant.111 This, along with the
absence of any effective check on those powers lends itself to a strong
potential for abuse during each phase of the criminal process.112 This
pertains to prosecutorial power in general but applies with exponentially
more force when a single prosecutor has the resources of both governments
at his or her disposal along with the unchecked authority to make decisions
on behalf of both sovereigns.

107. See Garry, supra note 71, at 874 (“The Constitution’s embodiment of the structural
principles of federalism is designed not just to create a workable government but to create
one that protects individual rights.”).
108. See Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive
and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 126 (1995) (observing that one of the risks
of successive prosecutions is undue trauma and burdens from successive trials).
109. See id. (listing the risks of exposing a defendant to successive punishments and
prosecutions).
110. See Gershman, supra note 67, at 395 (“More than thirty years later, as the
prosecutor's investigating, charging, convicting, and sentencing powers have escalated, the
‘inherent inequality’ between the prosecutor and the defendant has intensified, making the
adversary system almost obsolete.”).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 408–09 (“Uncontrolled discretion in the hands of a powerful government
official has the potential for abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this potential is . . . a reality.
Courts are unwilling to . . . rein in . . . prosecutors, resulting in a decline in the fairness of,
and a loss of public confidence in, the system.”).
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(1) Potential for Abuse In Making The Charging Decision

The prosecutor holds the fate of the accused in his hands in making the
charging decision.113 The potential for harassment is substantial as irrational
and even unconstitutional motivations are distinct possibilities.114 Due to
the federal-state concurrent jurisdiction, a cross-designated prosecutor can
file charges in either federal or state court.115 A number of considerations
inform this decision, many of which can give rise to selective and
vindictive prosecution claims.116 For example, choosing what forum to
prosecute particular offenders based on the availability of harsher
penalties.117 Or where a prosecutor brings more serious charges in another
sovereign after a defendant exercises his right to a jury trial and declines a
plea deal.118 As one commentator explains, “[i]n theory, defendants can
challenge dubious uses of prosecutorial discretion under the claims of
selective prosecution as a violation of equal protection, or prosecutorial
vindictiveness as a violation of due process.”119 However, such challenges
succeed in only the most exceptional circumstances.120
113. See Clymer, supra note 3, at 647–48. Clymer stated:
Because of differences between federal and state criminal justice systems, an
offender will often fare worse if prosecuted in federal court rather than state
court. He may be detained pending trial when he would have been released if
charged in state court, denied discovery allowable in state court, and confronted
with evidence that would have been suppressed in state court. If convicted, a
federally prosecuted defendant is likely to receive a longer sentence and to serve
far more of that sentence than he would if sentenced in state court.
Id.
114. See Heller supra note 49, at 1313 (explaining that prosecutorial abuse can occur
when a federal prosecutor decides to prosecute a case in federal court based on such
“constitutionally impermissible motives such as the defendant’s race, religion or
ethnicity . . . . ”).
115. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Likewise
under our federal system there can be simultaneous federal and State prosecutions where
similar or identical offenses under the two systems of law are committed as the result of
particular conduct on the part of a defendant.”).
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 122–32 and accompanying text.
118. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution
Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 247
(2005) (explaining that local prosecutors have the ability to threaten to bring charges in
federal court unless defendant pleads guilty).
119. Hollon, supra note 1, at 507.
120. See id. (citing United States v .Oakes, 11 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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(2) Selective Prosecution
Serious concerns about a criminal defendant’s civil rights and liberties
arise when a prosecutor chooses a certain forum based upon the likelihood
of a conviction.121 A cross-designated prosecutor can engage in
“prosecutorial forum shopping” to get the most favorable procedural and
substantive rules.122 Federal laws provide defendants with fewer procedural
rights than the law in many states.123 There is also a danger of manipulating
the criminal process in order to bypass an unfavorable evidentiary ruling.
For example, in United States v. Perchitti,124 the state of Florida originally
indicted the defendant for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. In
the state proceeding, the judge granted the defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence. The state prosecutor, Darrell Dirks, then filed a nolle prosse on
the state charges.125 Federal authorities subsequently indicted the defendant
and appointed Dirks as a SAUSA to conduct the federal prosecution.126
Unlike the state court, the District Court denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence.127 The defendant appealed the ruling but the Eleventh
121. See Clymer, supra note 3, at 676–77. Clymer stated:
As a result of the disparity between state and federal procedural and sentencing
regimes, much is at stake decisions are made more significant by the high
conviction rate in federal court and the rigid determinative federal sentencing
rules. Because of the relative certainty of conviction and harsher sentencing,
from an offender's perspective, the federal prosecutor's decision to bring federal
charges may be the single most important decision that any actor in the criminal
justice system makes. Defendants chosen for federal prosecution bear the brunt
of federalization, losing procedural protections and receiving and serving longer
sentences.
Id.
122. See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals to
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 769 (2005) (explaining that this
gives prosecutors the ability to choose the forum where they are most likely to obtain a
conviction, in part, because they are able to bypass state laws or policies favorable to the
accused).
123. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn
From the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 531 (2011) (“Fewer restrictions on the
government’s use of informants, easier access to wiretaps and warrants, less generous
discovery rights for defendants, and broader grand jury powers. Additionally, the federal
jury pool may also differ from the state jury pool.”).
124. See generally United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 675.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Circuit found no error in the District Court’s decision to deny the motion to
suppress, reasoning that there was no privity between the federal and state
government.128 Yet, to find that there was no privity when the same
prosecutor represented both governments in the separate prosecutions
seems to stretch the bounds of credulity.129
A selective prosecution concern arises when similarly situated
defendants who commit identical crimes face grossly disparate sentences
depending on whether the state or the federal government handles the
prosecution.130 Federal law generally provides for harsher punishments than
its state law counterparts. 131 For example, when a prosecutor foregoes state
prosecution in favor of federal prosecution of a drug offender charged with
possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine, the applicable federal guidelines
subject the defendant to a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. 132
The same defendant is only subject to a three-year minimum sentence if
prosecuted in the state courts of California or Pennsylvania.133
Courts have rejected equal protection and due process challenges to
disparate sentencing on the ground that a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute
a defendant federally is generally insulated from review.134 This is true even
128. Id.
129. The same set of facts were present in United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 893
(4th Cir. 1988) where the Fourth Circuit again found that there was no privity between the
two governmental parties even though the same prosecutor conducted each prosecution.
130. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 503 (“Broad grants of federal criminal jurisdiction
have created a situation in which defendants who commit identical crimes face grossly
disparate sentences depending on whether they are prosecuted by the state or by the federal
government.”).
131. See George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate:
Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 1024 (2001) (explaining that local
prosecutors can use threat of federal prosecution, with its likely harsher punishments, as a
threat in plea negotiations).
132. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2014). The sentencing guidelines are no longer
mandatory but many federal courts do not allow a downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines simply because a state statute proscribes a lower sentence for the same conduct.
Heller, supra note 49 at 1358.
133. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 113.51.5 (West 1991); see also 18 PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. § 7508(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1996).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 873 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that
the decision to prosecute drug-related charges in federal court while leaving arrest-related
charges in state court pursuant to explicit referral policy and agreement between federal and
state prosecutors is proper); see also United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir.
2001) (stating that the decision to bring federal charges to maximize punishment for a crime
that had historically been prosecuted under state system is proper); see also United States. v.
Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the decision to prosecute in federal
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where the prosecutor’s decision to file in federal court “was not made
pursuant to written policy, was motivated by a desire to impose a harsher
sentence, and was inconsistent with the treatment given other
defendants.”135 Thus, defendants are precluded from obtaining relief even
where the cross-designated prosecutor was motivated solely by a desire to
impose more stringent sentences.136 Another example of the extreme
sentencing disparities that can result based upon which sovereign
prosecutes a defendant can be seen in United States v. Willis.137 This case
involved two brothers involved in the same cocaine transaction.138 Federal
prosecutors dismissed the charges against one brother, who was prosecuted
in state court and sentenced only to probation plus time served while
awaiting trial.139 The other brother was tried in federal court and was
subject to the federal sentencing guideline range of forty-one to fifty-one
months.140
rather than state court is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation though federal
conviction yields a greater sentence); see also Reed v. United States, 985 F.2d 880, 882–83
(7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the decision to prosecute in federal rather than state court did not
evidence an abuse of prosecutorial discretion though state law was more lenient); see also
Bell v. United States, 48 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the decision to
prosecute in federal rather than state court was insufficient to prove a constitutional
violation, though federal conviction yields a greater sentence, because there was no proof
decision based on impermissible factors); see also United States v. Williams, 282 F.3d 679,
682 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that sentencing guidelines do not allow court to interfere with
prosecutor's discretion to charge defendant in federal rather than state court absent evidence
that prosecutor abused power); see also United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th
Cir. 2003) (stating that the decision to prosecute a robbery case in federal court may properly
be based on whether harsher penalties are available in federal or state court); see also United
States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 599 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that the decision to prosecute in
federal rather than state court does not constitute a due process violation, though defendant
was subjected to harsher sentence because prosecutor can properly be influenced by
available penalties); see also United States v. Clark, 8 F.3d 839, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(stating that the decision to prosecute in federal rather than state court was insufficient to
prove a constitutional violation though federal conviction would yield a greater sentence).
135. United States v. Oakes, 11 F. 3d 897, 898 (9th Cir. 1993).
136. See Oakes, 11 F.3d at 899 (noting that charging decisions not based on suspect
characteristics are insulated from review “even where the prosecutor’s decision to file in
federal court was not made pursuant to written policy, was motivated by a desire to impose a
harsher sentence, and was inconsistent with the treatment given other defendants”).
137. United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811, 811 (11th Cir. 1998).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Sun Beale, supra note 122, at 782 (outlining a situation where the sentencing
judge reduced the sentence to thirteen months but the appeals court vacated the judgment
and remanded for resentencing). However, this was before the Supreme Court mandated
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Another example of circumstances giving rise to a selective
prosecution claim can be seen in United States v. Jones.141 In Jones, the
defendant brought a selective prosecution claim based upon practices of the
federal-state joint task force program Project Exile.142 Project Exile was a
joint undertaking of the cities of Richmond and Norfolk, Virginia and the
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District to address criminal narcotics and
firearms offenses.143 One Commonwealth attorney and one attorney from
the state attorney general’s office were cross-designated as SAUSAs to
federally prosecute local offenders who committed firearm-related
offenses.144 The objective of Project Exile was to transfer offenders out of
the state system and into the federal system because state court judges were
perceived less likely to impose sentences “severe enough to serve as
sufficient punishment for, or adequate deterrence of, narcotics related
firearm offenses.”145 Not only were the sentencing structures in the federal
and state systems different, but pre-trial release from custody was routine
during state prosecutions and rare during federal prosecutions. Additionally,
there were racial differences between the state and federal jury pools. 146
One of the stated goals of Project Exile was to avoid “Richmond juries.”147
The jury pool for the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond was
approximately seventy-five percent African-American.148 In contrast, the
jury pool for the Richmond Division of the Eastern District of Virginia is

that the sentencing guidelines are advisory only. Now, presumably a judge may depart
downward in light of the existence of a lenient state sentence. Courts have taken various
approaches on this matter. Compare United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Mass.
2005) (finding that an out-of-guidelines adjustment was justified in order to bring defendant
Jaber’s sentence into line with the sentences imposed on other more culpable participants in
scheme), with United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005) (concluding that
except in most exceptional cases district courts should sentence within the guidelines in
order to prevent disparity).
141. United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304 (E.D. Va. 1999).
142. Id. at 311.
143. Id. at 307.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 309 (citing United States v. Nathan, No. 3:98cr116, Mem. Op. at 23–25
(E.D. Va., July 23, 1998)).
146. Id. at 313 (noting that seventy-five percent of Richmond juries are AfricanAmerican while only ten percent of federal juries are African-American).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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drawn from a broader area and was only about ten percent African
American at that time.149
Project Exile had a disparate effect on Virginia’s African-American
population.150 The court in Jones noted that Project Exile “would be
vulnerable on selective prosecution grounds if African-Americans were
routinely diverted from state to federal prosecution while prosecutors
allowed similarly situated Caucasian defendants to remain in state court.”151
However, the claim was dismissed because the defendant produced no
evidence to that effect.152
The judge in Jones also noted the substantial latitude afforded to
prosecuting attorneys is undoubtedly accompanied by the potential for
abuse. He stated that Project Exile “raises serious questions respecting basic
principles of federalism.”153 And that where “the local authorities claim to
have the capacity to address the problem, the invited federal incursion
raises serious motivational concerns.”154 These examples are illustrative of
the abuses of discretion that can occur when a single prosecutor possesses
the ability to manipulate the investigative and prosecutorial resources of
either sovereign to secure a conviction.
(3) Vindictive Prosecution
A vindictive prosecution concern arises when a cross-designated
prosecutor uses his or her authority to increase charges or to retry a
defendant in another jurisdiction to obtain what he or she believes is a more
just result.155 Courts have consistently declined to find vindictive
prosecution where the prosecutor increased charges before trial, reasoning
149. As troubling as this may seem, the court nevertheless held that the defendant
showed no evidence to suggest that the selection of federal juries was constitutionally infirm.
It went on to explain that a defendant has no right to a jury of any particular racial
composition so long as that jury is fairly selected from the jurisdiction it serves. See Jones,
36 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
150. See Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (noting that approximately ninety percent of the
Project Exile defendants are African-American).
151. Id. at 311.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 313.
154. Id. at 316.
155. See Killion, supra note 11, at 800 (explaining that “allegiances can cause a
SAUSA to skirt the line between zealous advocacy and vindictive prosecution.”).
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that a prosecutor has broad discretion to add charges in the pre-trial
period.156 The burden to establish vindictive prosecution is so high that even
when the facts of the case strongly suggest vindictiveness on the part of the
prosecutor, the courts decline to find such.157 Allowing prosecutors this
level of discretion effectively allows the prosecutor to impermissibly
substitute his or her judgment for that of the judge or jury.
There is a substantial vindictive prosecution concern present when a
prosecutor uses his or her ability to bring charges in another jurisdiction as
leverage over the defendant to obtain a desired outcome. In the plea
bargaining context, there is a significant risk of coercion, duress, and
manipulation that forces individual defendants to accept an unfavorable
plea deal in one jurisdiction to avoid facing prosecution in a less favorable
forum.158 As one defense attorney stated, “[c]riminal defendants and their
lawyers often are faced with the potential for dual prosecutions . . . . They
must always ‘bargain in the shadow of the law.’”159 An example of this can
be seen in United States v. Raymer.160 In Raymer, the defendant claimed
that the following factors established a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness:
(1) the federal prosecution was undertaken after defendant asserted
rights incident to extradition, (2) a superseding indictment adding
substantive counts was returned after the defendant obtained pretrial
release, contrary to the government’s wishes, (3) the federal government
lacked substantial involvement in the investigation and prosecution of
this case, and (4) the state and federal investigations and prosecutions
were influenced by the discretion of a single state prosecutor. 161

156. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit a prosecutor from carrying
out a threat made during plea negotiations, to bring additional charges against an accused
who refused to plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged).
157. See Killion, supra note 11, at 800 (“[T]he courts have required defendants to meet
the difficult burden of proving the elements of selective and vindictive prosecution, even
though evidence supporting these claims is unlikely to appear on the record.”).
158. See Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution
Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 243
(2005) (“They can also use the threat of federal prosecution to leverage longer sentences in
the plea-bargaining process . . . .”).
159. See id. at 265.
160. See United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1991).
161. Id. at 1039.
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The Tenth Circuit observed that it would be “naïve to think that the
federal prosecution was not motivated in some part by the extradition
difficulties.” The court further noted “the prosecutor’s obtaining a more
serious federal indictment when the defendant asserted a right concerning
extradition may appear to warrant an inference of vindictiveness.”162
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit found that this did not warrant a
presumption of vindictiveness because the prosecutor’s strategy was a
product of failed plea negotiations which culminated in the defendant’s
insistence on formal extradition.163 This is illustrative of the difficulty in
trying to assert a vindictive prosecution claim based on pretrial events.164
A vindictive prosecution concern also arises when a defendant
successfully obtains dismissal of state charges only to have the same
prosecutor, in his capacity as a cross-designated SAUSA, indict the
defendant federally for the same conduct. This troubling sequence of
events is exactly what happened in United States v. Bernhardt.165 In 1984,
the state of Hawaii charged the Bernhardts with conspiracy and
misapplication of bank funds.166 The Bernhardts obtained a dismissal on
statute of limitation grounds.167 However, shortly before the state court
dismissed the case, Stephen Mayo, the prosecutor in charge of the state
case, contacted the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii to
express his concern over the pending dismissal.168 Up until that point, there
had been no federal involvement in the matter, nor had the federal
government even considered the matter “one that justified exercise of
federal sovereignty”.169 The U.S. Attorney agreed to undertake a federal
prosecution under the condition that Mayo would become the lead attorney
for the federal case and that the state would pay Mayo’s salary.170 The
Bernhardts moved to dismiss the federal indictment on double jeopardy

162. Id. at 1042.
163. Id.
164. While this abuse of power to gain leverage over a defendant most often occurs in
the plea-bargaining context, it can also occur when the prosecutor needs the defendant to
testify against a co-defendant. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 504.
165. United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1987).
166. Id. at 181.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 181–82.

548

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 521 (2015)

grounds, as well as vindictive prosecution and collateral estoppel.171 The
Ninth Circuit found that this was more than “mere cooperation,” and
described the circumstances as “troubling”.172 Nevertheless, the court
rejected the Bernhardts claims, relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine and
reasoning that the federal and state prosecutions, although for the same
conduct, were prosecuting separate offenses.173 This is illustrative of the
enormous burden criminal defendants have in challenging the practice of
cross-designated prosecutors. Because of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the
designation of a SAUSA permits an attorney to proceed with what the
courts would otherwise presume to be a vindictive prosecution.
A similar situation occurred in United States v. Belcher.174 In Belcher,
Commonwealth’s Attorney McAfee indicted defendants on drug offenses in
state circuit court.175 The indictments were dismissed and McAfee secured
another indictment.176 The defendant then sought dismissal of that
indictment.177 While this motion was pending, McAfee, in his federal guise,
drafted a three-count indictment against Belcher.178 He then proceeded to
write letters to an Assistant United States Attorney and a United States
Attorney expressing his concern that the State court would dismiss the
indictment.179 In the letters he also indicated his willingness to handle the
Belcher’s federal prosecution.180 After learning that the U.S. Attorney’s
office would submit his indictment to the federal grand jury, McAfee
moved to nolle prosse the pending state indictment.181 The defendants
moved to dismiss the federal indictment based, in part, on theories of
selective and vindictive prosecution.182 The court found that there was a
valid vindictive prosecution claim because the prosecutor filed new, and

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 182–83.
Id. at 183.
United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991).
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
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more severe, federal charges based on the same transaction after the
defendant successfully appealed his state conviction.183
That case was not the first where McAfee secured an indictment in a
different sovereign after an unsuccessful prosecution.184 The court noted
that he appeared recently as a SAUSA to prosecute two defendants on drug
charges.185 The jury acquitted both defendants and McAfee proceeded to
secure a state indictment on the same charges.186 He gained a conviction of
the defendant in State court even though she had been acquitted in federal
court.187 The court observed, “It is likely that somewhere in such a chain of
events prosecution ends and persecution begins, that government power
becomes so oppressive to the citizen that she no longer has the power or
will to defend herself.”188 Unfortunately, the opinion in that case is an
anomaly among the cases involving challenges to cross-designated
prosecutors.189 If defendants are to have any protection from abuses of
power similar to those illustrated above, other courts must take note of the
reasoning behind the decision and follow suit.
(4) Disproportionate Punishment
A defendant’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment is also implicated when a prosecutor uses his or her power to
harass or punish the defendant by overcharging and thus, exposing the
defendant to excessive or disproportionate punishment relative to the
defendant’s culpability.190 Because of the overlap in offenses and penalties
for the same conduct in state and federal criminal laws, a cross-designated
prosecutor has the power to bring charges in both jurisdictions for the same
act, and thus, punish a defendant more than once for that act.191 The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment should serve as
183. Id. at 669–70.
184. Id. at 673.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Although many courts have considered cases containing similar facts, those courts
have declined to find any violation. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
190. King, supra note 108, at 126.
191. Id.
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a check on this type of disproportionate punishment. As one scholar noted,
“[i]f double jeopardy permits legislatures to authorize successive penalties
for the same conduct, then the more flexible commands of the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clauses must pick up the slack.”192
Likewise, Justice Frankfurter suggested in United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess,193 that the appropriate source of constraint on the ability to cumulate
punishment is the limit on proportionality in the Eighth Amendment. He
wrote:
If it be suggested that a succession of separate trials for the enforcement
of a great number of criminal sanctions, even though set forth in
advance in a single statute, might be a form of cruelty or oppression, the
answer is that the Constitution itself has guarded against such an attempt
“to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials . . . by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. 194

An example of disproportionate punishment can be seen in United
States v. Grimes.195 Grimes was charged and convicted in state and federal
court for the same bank robbery.196 He made persistent attempts to have his
state and federal sentences served concurrently or credited against each
other.197 However, his attempts were unsuccessful because “[t]he rule of
presumptive concurrency of sentences . . . does not apply where one
sentence is imposed by a federal court and the other by a state court.” 198
The defendant’s sentencing challenge was premised in a double jeopardy
claim because the duplicative punishment was allowed pursuant to the dual
sovereignty doctrine.199 The court in Grimes urged a reexamination of
Bartkus to determine whether the justifications of the dual sovereignty
doctrine are still viable with the expansion of federal criminal law.200
However, the court acknowledged that it was not the proper forum to
overturn “a legal directive from the Supreme Court” and thus rejected the
192. Id. at 125.
193. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 556 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
194. Id.
195. United States v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1981).
196. Id. at 97.
197. See id. at 98 (“Persistent attempts have been made by Ali to have his state and
federal sentences served concurrently or credited against each other.”).
198. Id. at 100.
199. Id. at 97.
200. Id. at 101.

CENTRALIZED PROSECUTION

551

defendant’s double jeopardy claim.201 Although this case did not involve a
cross-designated prosecutor, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a
cross-designated prosecutor uses his or her power to overcharge in order to
disproportionately punish the defendant.
(5) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
This model of centralized prosecution also has a detrimental impact on
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.202 Having to “fight in two arenas at
once” invariably creates disadvantages for the defense counsel, and thus for
the defendant.203 The government is able to potentially exhaust the
defendant’s financial ability to adequately defend himself by “whipsawing
him from one jurisdiction to another.”204 Additionally, many defense
attorneys may be familiar with the laws, rules, and procedures in only one
of the jurisdictions. This may necessitate hiring a second attorney.
Unfortunately, as many criminal defendants are unable to afford their own
attorney and must use an overworked and underpaid public defender. This
presents another problem: the potential inability of an overburdened public
defender to recognize and address the problems a defendant will face when
subjected to concurrent prosecutions. The expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction over the years has resulted in increasing resources being
devoted to enforcing federal criminal law.205 In contrast, public defense
services remain devastatingly underfunded.206 There is a real danger of
deficient performance on the part of the defense counsel when the public
defense system is overburdened and underfunded.207 A cross-designated
prosecutor has the ability to take advantage of a defendant by
overburdening his defense counsel to the point where any assistance
received is virtually ineffective.
201. Id. at 104.
202. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 501–02 (explaining that the resource disparity caused
by Congress’ systematic underfunding of defense services violates the defendant’s right to
counsel).
203. See David L. Lane, Twice Bitten: Denial of the Right to Counsel in Successive
Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1869, 1900 (2009).
204. See Knoepp & Miller, supra note 14, at 171.
205. See Hollon, supra note 1, at 501–02.
206. Id.
207. Id. (explaining that in the overburdened public defender services, ineffective
assistance more often results from an attorney’s errors of omission).
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(6) Defendant’s Interest in Finality and Accuracy of the Verdict

Beyond equal protection, due process, effective assistance, and
proportionate punishment violations, centralized prosecutions also affect a
defendant’s interest in finality and accuracy of the verdict. As one
commentator observes, “When the federal government seeks to prosecute a
defendant following an acquittal in a state prosecution, the interests and
rights of the defendant are often compromised . . . . ”208 Multiple
prosecutions allow the government to hone its trial strategies through
successive attempts at conviction. This is especially true when the same
prosecutor conducts each proceeding. As Justice Souter explained in his
dissent in United States v. Dixon, the government could “. . . bring a person
to trial again and again for that same conduct, violating the principle of
finality, subjecting him repeatedly to all the burdens of trial, rehearsing its
prosecution, and increasing the risk of erroneous conviction . . . .”209
Although Dixon concerned successive prosecutions as a double jeopardy
violation, the dangers presented in Justice Souter’s dissent apply with
considerably more force when a single prosecutor is able to prosecute a
defendant in separate sovereigns for the same conduct using the same
evidence.210 Both practices conflict with the prosecutor’s well-known duty,
not simply to convict but to seek justice.211 In discussing the prosecutor’s
responsibilities, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]s not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a particular and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones.212

208. Robert Matz, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If At First You
Don’t Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 375 (1997).
209. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 761 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
210. See Knoepp & Miller, supra note 14, at 171 (“The Cross Designated-Prosecutor
could utilize his position to refile in the second forum by his ability to use certain evidence
barred in the first. New evidence could come to light which might increase the potential for a
second, and perhaps successful prosecution. . . . A premature prosecution which was not
successful could be re-filed in the second forum upon further development of the case.”).
211. Alafair S. Bourke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 83
(2010).
212. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S 78, 88 (1935); see also Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The function of the
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A prosecutor retrying a defendant after an unsuccessful prosecution—
taking a second bite of the apple—is undoubtedly an impermissible
prosecutorial practice. Yet, courts have allowed exactly that. There have
been many cases involving subsequent indictments based on a prosecutorial
sense that justice has not been served.213 When this occurs, the prosecutor is
improperly substituting his or her own judgment for that of the judge or
jury.214 An example of this can be seen in United States v. Padilla where the
defendant pled guilty to state criminal charges only to be federally indicted
by the same prosecutor utilizing the same evidence. In his concurrence,
Judge Logan observed, “It appears to be the state prosecutor’s frustration
with the sentence given defendant by the state court which led him, in his
new capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney, to seek the federal
indictment.215 In the previously discussed case of United States v. FigueroaSoto,216 the court failed to find sufficient collusion where the federal
authorities: (1) requested state prosecution, (2) sat at the prosecutor’s table,
(3) testified as witnesses, (4) collected evidence for use by the state in the
state prosecution, (5) postponed sentencing a prosecution witness until after
he testified for the state, (6) delayed a forfeiture proceeding to avoid
prejudicing the state prosecution, and lastly (7) cross-designated the state
prosecutor as a SAUSA to conduct the federal prosecution while still on the
prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to take as many skins of victims as possible
to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give
those accused of crime a fair trial.”).
213. See Lane, supra note 203, at n. 234; see, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84–
86 (1985) (defendant confessed to crime in one jurisdiction and was sentenced to life
imprisonment, refused to testify to grand jury in separate jurisdiction, and was subsequently
charged with and tried for capital murder in that jurisdiction despite widespread
publicity); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 121–22 (1959) (defendant acquitted of
bank robbery in federal district court, then investigated and charged in state court using same
evidence supplied by FBI agent who investigated federal case); see also United States v.
Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendant granted probation on state charges and
state then asked U.S Attorney to prosecute without success; only after defendant violated
probation on the state charges and state renewed request for federal prosecution were federal
charges brought); or perhaps the most famous of all, the “Rodney King Case,” United States
v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1425 (9th Cir. 1994) (four Los Angeles police officers acquitted in
state court on charges of assault with a deadly weapon and excessive use of force by a police
officer were later charged with multiple federal crimes, including violation of King's
constitutional rights).
214. Lane, supra note 203, at 1908.
215. United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 485–86 (10th Cir. 1978) (Logan, J.,
concurring).
216. United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1991).
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state’s payroll.217 Accepting that this level of collusion is permissible
simply because the prosecutions were conducted in separate sovereigns
stretches the bounds of belief. Criminal defendants are already in an
inherently unequal position in comparison to prosecutors without the added
burden of a prosecutor having the ability to manipulate the resources of two
sovereigns.
The danger of convicting innocent defendants also occurs in the plea
bargaining context. Prosecutors possess unchecked power to overcharge
and generate easy pleas.218 As one scholar noted, “[t]his excessive plea
leverage reduces the prosecutors’ incentive to separate innocent from guilty
defendants at the charging stage, increasing the chance that innocent
defendants will be convicted.”219 In this context, prosecutors become the
sole judges of crime and punishment.220 This potential for abuse of power is
increased when a single prosecutor has the unrestrained ability to charge a
defendant under both state and federal criminal statutes.
b. Harms to the Criminal Justice System
In addition to the numerous risks and abuses defendants face with
centralized prosecutions, when multiple sovereigns are “investigating the
same crime and pursuing punishment of the same defendant . . . it is
wasteful of police, prosecutorial and judicial resources.”221 In discussing the
increased federalization of crime and its effect on federal courts, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated:
The trend to federalize crimes that traditionally been handled in state
courts not only is taxing the Judiciary’s resources and affecting its
budget needs, but it also threatens to change entirely the nature of our
federal system . . . . Federal courts were not created to adjudicate local
crimes, no matter how sensational or heinous the crimes may be. State
courts do, can, and should handle such problems. 222

217. See id. at 1018–19.
218. Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:
Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641,
1679–80 (2002).
219. Id.
220. See Luna & Wade, supra note 90, at 1423.
221. Lane, supra note 203, at 1900.
222. William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
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These concerns apply with full force when a cross-designated prosecutor is
able to bypass state courts and circumvent a variety of protective state laws
and thus, use federal prosecution as a tool to secure a more favorable
outcome.223 When cases that have been traditionally tried by state courts are
pulled into the federal court system, the capacity of the relatively small
federal court system is overwhelmed. 224 This hinders the ability of the
federal judiciary to fulfill its other functions, such as the enforcement of
federal constitutional and statutory rights.225
In addition to the increasing number of cases competing for the scarce
attention of federal courts, the federal prison system is also affected by the
higher rate of federal prosecutions that have followed the federalization of
crime.226 Following the implementation of joint task forces like Project
Exile, the federal prison system has experienced a higher rate of inmate
increase than state systems.227
Federal Courts are not meant to be courts of general jurisdiction; they
are to resolve the defined set of matters that the Constitution envisions for
them.228 Extensive prosecutions of the overlapping federal and state
offenses blur this unique role. The federal expansion of criminal laws and
the increasing overlap and entanglement of state and federal laws and
enforcement of those laws has transformed the historic state-federal judicial
relationship into an increasingly dysfunctional judicial system. 229

BRANCH (1999).
223. See Beale, supra note 122, at 768–69 (“These include a more powerful federal
grand jury system in which witnesses and potential defendants have fewer procedural rights,
lower standards for the approval of search warrants, a lower burden of proof to justify a wire
tap, and more restricted discovery of the government's case. Unlike state law, federal law
also permits a conviction on the basis of an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony.”).
224. See Brown, supra note 131, at 997 (“A large volume of prosecutions under the
overlapping statutes may crowd out ‘traditional federal criminal law prosecutions and
many . . . increasingly complicated federal civil suits . . . .’”).
225. See Beale, supra note 122, at 772–73.
226. See JAMES STRAZELLA ET AL., TASK FORCE ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUST. SEC., THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 51 (1998) (including the higher rate of inmate
increase in federal prisons as one of the drains on federal resources).
227. See Brown, supra note 131, at 997.
228. Id. at 998.
229. See Harry Litman & Mark Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for
Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCI. 72, 72 (1996).
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Various scholars assert that a “vigorous federalism in the criminal law
area operates to protect both state and national institutions.”230 However,
the federalization of criminal law and the use of cross-designated
prosecutors has resulted in a breakdown of the “vigorous federalism”
necessary to protect the separate functions of these institutions.231
IV. Ineffective Protections
There are several commonly proposed protections that ostensibly
protect a criminal defendant from the various abuses and injustices inherent
in a model of centralized prosecution. However, as will be explained, these
protections are ineffective and do not provide defendants with any real
redress.
A. The Bartkus Exception
Defendants have futilely tried to find recourse via judicial remedy,
asserting the Bartkus exception as a defense to successive prosecutions.232
230. See Brown, supra note 131, at 998.
231. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 229, at 72–74. They explained:
Critics of federalization foresee in the expansion of federal criminal legislation
the potential for dire consequences for federalism and for the federal criminal
justice system: a flood of local cases overwhelming the federal courts and
impairing their ability to carry out their traditional functions; interference with
state control over domains traditionally regulated by the states; harm to
democracy as decision making is shifted away from the most directly
accountable levels of government; preemption of valuable experimentation with
local solutions to crime problems; inefficient duplication of resources;
ineffective legislation enacted for short-term political benefits; and unfairly
disparate treatment of defendants selected for federal prosecution.
Id.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 88 F. App’x 96, 98 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have
never formally recognized or applied such an exception . . . .”); United States v. Tirrell, 120
F.3d 670, 677 (7th Cir. 2004) (“At any rate, the exception, if it exists at all, is a very narrow
one. Even significant cooperation between federal and state agencies is not enough to make
the second prosecution a ‘sham.’” (citations omitted)); United States v. McCloud, No.
CR406-247, 2007 WL 1706353, at *8 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (“The Eleventh Circuit has
‘repeatedly refused to decide whether such an exception actually exists.’" (quoting United
States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.13 (11th Cir. 1999))). But see United
States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir. 1996) (“We emphasize that the Bartkus
exception is narrow. It is limited to situations in which one sovereign so thoroughly
dominates or manipulates the prosecutorial machinery of another that the latter retains little
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Courts continuously resist attempts to reverse convictions of those
defendants claiming the exception, even in cases presenting the strongest
evidence of intergovernmental collusion—dual prosecutions led by crossdesignated prosecutors. The context of the Bartkus opinion suggesting
judicial recourse is inherently narrow and fails to serve as a reliable claim
for threatened defendants.
The “sham prosecution” exception arising in the Supreme Court’s
dicta fails to offer defendants any real protection when facing simultaneous
or successive prosecutions by a single cross-designated prosecutor. The
courts have set the bar so high for the “sham prosecution” exception that
sufficiently collusive conduct between state and federal officials is very
seldom found, even when the same cross-designated prosecutor handles
both prosecutions.233 In United States v. Angleton,234 the trial court
responded that the facts of Bartkus and many other subsequent prosecution
cases considered by the federal courts indicated there could be extensive
involvement between governments without such cooperation rising to the
level of a collusive prosecution.235 “Among the examples cited by the trial
court were prosecutions in which (1) state sovereigns requested federal
prosecution, (2) the initial sovereign turned over all of its evidence to the
or no volition in its own proceedings.”); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1438 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has recognized a “narrow exception” to the doctrine of
dual sovereignty); United States v. Knight, No. 05-81155, 2006 WL 1722199, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. June 22, 2006) (finding that dual involvement of an officer in both federal and state
prosecutions of the defendant invited abuse and constituted a “sham prosecution”). For a
summary of case law concerning the Bartkus Exception, see Guzman, 85 F.3d at 826–27.
233. Courts have set the bar so high that the “exception” is effectively meaningless,
thus encouraging further such collusion. See, e.g., Baker, 88 F.App'x at 98 (“[W]e have
never formally recognized or applied such an exception. . . .”); Tirrell, 120 F.3d at 677 (“At
any rate, the exception, if it exists at all, is a very narrow one. Even significant cooperation
between federal and state agencies is not enough to make the second prosecution a ‘sham.’”
(citations omitted)); McCloud, 2007 WL 1706353, at *8 (“The Eleventh Circuit has
‘repeatedly refused to decide whether such an exception actually exists.’” (quoting United
States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.13 (11th Cir. 1999))). But see Guzman,
85 F.3d at 827 (“We emphasize that the Bartkus exception is narrow. It is limited to
situations in which one sovereign so thoroughly dominates or manipulates the prosecutorial
machinery of another that the latter retains little or no volition in its own proceedings.”);
Koon, 34 F.3d at 1438 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has recognized a “narrow exception” to
the doctrine of dual sovereignty); Knight, 2006 WL 1722199, at *3 (finding that dual
involvement of an officer in both federal and state prosecutions of the defendant invited
abuse and constituted a “sham prosecution”).
234. 221 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
235. See id. at 714–15.
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second, and (3) cross designations of state officials as federal officials were
made.”236
The failure of courts to find sufficient collusion to invoke the
exception does not mean that collusive conduct does not occur or that it is
not harmful when it does occur.237 Because of the narrowness of the
Bartkus exception (coupled with judicial deference to prosecutorial
decision-making), many improper practices escape scrutiny. Some of these
practices include “enticing guilty pleas that are later used in another
jurisdiction, rejuvenation or sharing of tainted evidence, or any other
obvious attempt to strengthen charges against an individual beyond normal
investigatory techniques.”238 The opportunity for the use of these improper
tactics is increased greatly when a single prosecutor conducts both
prosecutions.
Only one court has applied the principles of the Bartkus exception as a
justification for denying a successive prosecution by a cross-designated
prosecutor. In United States v. Belcher,239 the judge observed that the
prosecutor, by virtue of his cross-designation as a SAUSA, had the ability
to function as a prosecutor at both the State and federal levels.240 The judge
reasoned that the kind of power possessed by the prosecutor in that case
was inconsistent with the concepts of federalism implicit in the
Constitution.241 He explained that the fact that the “two sovereigns have
essentially pooled their powers in one prosecutor strongly suggests to the
court that in reality there are no longer two sovereigns at work . . . . the
pooling of prosecutorial power effectively creates one ‘super sovereign,’
i.e., a unitary government.”242
If the issues motivating the Bartkus Court’s concern are to have
meaningful redress, courts must explicitly define the scope of the “sham
prosecution” to include instances of cross-designated prosecutors
prosecuting defendants in different sovereigns. Whether the prosecutor is
actually harassing the defendant or manipulating his role on behalf of either
236. See White, supra note 44, at 186.
237. See Lane, supra note 203, at 1899.
238. See id. at 1907.
239. 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va.1991).
240. See id. at 673.
241. See id. at 671 (“[I]t seems to the court that if the same prosecutor simultaneously
derives power from both a State and the federal government, then the whole underpinning of
federalism is destroyed.”).
242. See id. at 671.
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sovereign is immaterial, as representation of dual sovereigns constructively
serves as undue influence on both, constructively resulting in a “sham.”
B. Petite Policy and State Legislation
To ameliorate some of the unfairness inherent in multiple prosecutions
by different sovereigns, the federal government and many states have
established limitations, or even prohibitions, on subsequent prosecutions
after an initial prosecution in which double jeopardy has attached.243
1. Petite Policy
Only one branch of the Federal government, the Executive, has
presented an available protection for harms occurring in the crossdesignation system. As a response to the concerns over the dual-sovereignty
issues in Bartkus and Abbate, the Department of Justice instituted the Petite
Policy,244 which establishes a strong presumption against federal
reprosecution of a defendant already prosecuted by a state for the same
conduct.245
The Petite Policy has been formalized as Section 9-2.031 of the United
States Attorneys’ Manual, a publication of departmental policy
statements.246 The Petite Policy “precludes the initiation or continuation of
a federal prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecution based
on substantially the same act(s) or transactions(s).”247 These guidelines are
to direct the Department of Justice in deciding whether the Government
should prosecute a defendant following a state prosecution.248 Under the
Policy, prosecutors are to presume that any prior trial vindicated federal

243. See White, supra note 44, at 174.
244. Named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (vacating a judgment at
the request of the Justice Department made in accordance with its new policy).
245. White, supra note 44, at 199.
246. See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 229, at 73.
247. See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 177–178 (2004).
248. See id.
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interests.249 However, the presumption can be overcome if there are factors
suggesting an “un-vindicated federal interest.”250
Even when the policy is followed to its full effect, it fails to address
concerns raised by centralized prosecutions. Because the adhering to the
Policy is not mandatory, various forms of coercive harassment in
simultaneous prosecutions are not deterred, thus, it only dilutes those
threats of subsequent federal proceedings without providing protections
from or redress for any injustices faced.251 Additionally, the Petite policy is
susceptible to manipulation and political pressure.252 Criminal defendants
facing simultaneous or successive prosecutions should find no comfort in
the existence of the Petite Policy, as it vests no rights in the accused. 253
There is no recourse for a prosecutor’s failure to follow the guidelines set
out in the Policy.254 When prosecutors ignore the internal guidelines, courts
249. See id. at 180.
250. See White, supra note 44, at 199.
[1] a failure to convict resulting from incompetence, corruption, intimidation or
undue influence;
[2] court or jury nullification in clear disregard of the evidence or the law;
[3] the unavailability of significant evidence not timely discovered or known by
the prosecution, or because it was kept from the trier of fact's consideration
because of an erroneous interpretation of the law;
[4] the failure in a prior state prosecution to prove an element of a state offense
that is not an element of the contemplated federal offense; and
[5] the exclusion of charges in a prior federal prosecution out of concern for
fairness to other defendants, or for significant resource considerations that
favored separate federal prosecutions.
The presumption may also be overcome where the violation of federal law
(1) involves a “compelling federal interest,” (2) the offense involves “egregious
conduct,” or (3) where any prior prosecution is regarded as “manifestly
inadequate” in light of the federal interest at issue.
Id.
251. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
252. See id. at 201–02.
253. See id. at 202.
254. It has been clearly established that since the Petite policy is an internal rule,
criminal defendants may not invoke it to bar prosecution by the federal government. See,
e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 267 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that failure to
abide by the Petite Policy by failing to obtain approval before bringing successive federal
charges after a state prosecution does not authorize reversal of conviction); United States v.
Thomas, 759 F.2d 659, 668 (8th Cir. 1985) (explaining that failure to follow the Petite
Policy does not create a right defendants can invoke to bar federal prosecution); United
States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 725 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[The Petite Policy] is merely an internal
guideline for exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial review.”).; United
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have consistently found the policy to be non-binding and unenforceable,
thereby leaving criminal defendants without remedy.255
If the Department of Justice is to provide substantive protection to
criminal defendants, Congress must follow the lead of the States and
establish the underlying principles of Petite Policy as binding via
appropriate legislation.256 Many states have enacted legislation that
precludes state prosecution of a defendant for harms properly addressed in
federal proceedings.257 However, even if all fifty states enacted this
legislation, a defendant remains unprotected against a successive
prosecution by the federal government.258
The following proposals serve as guidance for unilateral action by the
Executive and Legislative branches, while presenting justiciable claims for
litigants to secure the Court’s protection from those constitutional
violations presented by centralized prosecutions. Both the Petite Policy and
its State parallels were derived from the illustration presented by the
Bartkus exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine known as the “sham
prosecution.”
States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) (“In any case, it is apparent that the
Petite policy is intended to be no more than self-regulation on the part of the Department of
Justice.”).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e are not
prepared to hold that a letter, press release, or similar statement of the Attorney General,
which is not promulgated as a regulation of the Justice Department, and published in the
Federal Registrar, can serve to invalidate an otherwise valid indictment returned by the
Grand Jury.”); United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 294–95 (4th Cir. N.C. 2003); United
States v. Kriens, 270 F.3d 597, 603 (8th Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Thompson, 579
F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A] press release expressing a policy statement and not
promulgated as a regulation of the Department of Justice and published in the Federal
Register is simply a ‘housekeeping provision of the Department.”’).
256. Several jurists argue that the Petite Policy should be binding and provide
defendants with enforceable due process protections. See United States v. Thompson, 579
F.2d 1184, 1189–92 (10th Cir. 1978) (Seth, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the policy was
violated and the defendant should be able to receive the benefit of being protected from
unfairness associated with needless prosecutions)
257. See Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383, nn. 191–92 (1986). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1303 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (1984); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.64 (1982); MINN. STAT. § 609.045
(1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-504 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:1-11 (West
1982); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 40.20 (1981 & 1984-85 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 130 (West 1968); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111 (1983); and WISC. STAT. ANN. § 939.71
(West 1982).
258. See Lane, supra note 203, at 1884.
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A majority of State legislatures have taken the Petite Policy one step
further, making similar principles binding on State prosecutors in order to
prevent successive prosecutions once State interests have been adjudicated
in federal courts.259 Both of these protections are “flawed or nonexistent.”260
Moreover, as current remedial schemes only address harms arising from
successive convictions, neither the Petite Policy, nor state intervention, has
sufficiently addressed harms arising in initial proceedings or occurring after
an initial acquittal.
The following proposals serve as guidance for unilateral action by the
Executive and Legislative branches, while presenting justiciable claims for
litigants to secure the Court’s protection from those constitutional
violations presented by centralized prosecutions.
V. Remedies
A. Potential Remedies from Executive Policy
Though the Petite Policy has served as an internal check on successive
prosecutions by the Federal Government, the Department of Justice can
easily address issues arising from the use of a cross-designated SAUSA.
First, the Petite Policy should be expanded to bar all successive
prosecutions of a defendant for harms previously litigated in State courts,
regardless of the outcome. The current policy bars prosecution of convicted
defendants, but fails to apply to those State prosecutions that prove
unsuccessful. By extending the Petite Policy, the Department of Justice can
prevent cross-designated State prosecutors from having “two bites at the
apple.” The Policy can also be expanded to initiate Federal stays of all
proceedings against defendants who have been simultaneously exposed to
State proceedings.
Simultaneous prosecutions present an array of harms independent of
those created by successive proceedings. Whether the conduct underlying
federal indictments is the same or wholly irrelevant to those ongoing in
State courts, simultaneous prosecution by a cross-designated prosecutor
259. See Dawson, supra note 27, at 294 (“Thirteen states impose a similar limitation,
limiting state prosecution of offenses arising out of the same conduct previously subject to
federal prosecution.”).
260. See Lane, supra note 203, at 1882 (listing protections normally suggested as
effective for safeguarding defendants’ rights in successive prosecutions).
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threatens a defendant’s ability to negotiate or prepare a material defense.
Strains on defendant’s resources, defendant’s counsel, and the courts are
too substantive in this context and further no legitimate governmental
interest. A policy barring simultaneous prosecutions will afford
fundamentally fair defense and grant judges comfort in knowing that their
sovereign will not lose custody of the defendant in the process.
An expansive Petite Policy may be a substantive amendment to the
current prosecutorial system, but the most effective Executive remedy
comes from policies traditionally found in the private sector—the use of the
“Chinese Firewall”. In the private setting, these “firewalls” serve as internal
veils preventing attorneys from accessing records of, or contributing to,
cases against parties represented by the employee in previous
employment.261 The same severance of collaboration can be implemented in
the Department of Justice, barring SAUSAs from representing States in
criminal proceedings against the same defendant. By removing the SAUSA
from his role on behalf of his respective State, the Department of Justice
can implement a system preventing prosecutorial abuse of dual sovereignty.
Though it may only be enforceable internally, the limited protection instills
a policy that prioritizes sovereign independence. In the same way the Petite
Policy has had influence on successive prosecution, a firewall can curtail
centralization and put SAUSAs on notice that their appearance in federal
proceedings will be strictly on behalf of the United States.
State Attorneys General may be able to establish similar firewall
policies independently of the Department of Justice. Putting crossdesignated State prosecutors on notice that appearance on behalf of the
United States strips authorities to prosecute the defendant on behalf of the
State can force SAUSAs to weigh State’s interests in the case while
prioritizing their relationship with the State.
B. Potential Remedies from Legislative Policy

261. See Michael Davis & Josephine Johnston, Conflict of Interest in Four Professions:
A Comparative Analysis, NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22946/ (noting that law firms have created
methods for “screening” lawyers within firms as a way of managing conflicts of interest,
often described as “firewalls”).
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State legislatures have acted proactively in codifying the underlying
principles of the Petite Policy, but Congress has yet to do so.262 Federal
legislation barring simultaneous or successive prosecutions of defendants in
State proceedings will provide judges with the authority to enforce
procedural and substantive fairness. By implementing and expanding the
Petite Policy via statute, Congress can provide a bevy of remedies typically
unavailable to judges or defendants.263 Legislative action extends
enforcement to injunctive relief, possible grounds for dismissing a case, or
an outright ban of SAUSAs appearance in particular cases.
State legislatures have already shown a willingness to implement
policies rather than waiting for executive intervention.264 By expanding
current policies to bar simultaneous prosecutions, while implementing
mandatory “firewall” protections, States can maintain independence,
restrict agents from sacrificing State interests, and protect against the
unnecessary expenditure of State resources.
C. Potential Claims for Judicial Intervention
Absent affirmative intervention from the Executive or Legislative
branches, the only remedy a defendant may seek in a centralized
prosecution is via judicial intervention. Only one case, United States v.
Belcher, has resulted in a dismissal of a successive prosecution by a crossdesignated prosecutor on behalf of an alternate sovereign. The court limited
the scope of the ruling by dismissing the subsequent case on collateral
estoppel grounds, deeming the acquittal of the defendant in one case as a
non-justiciable resolution of fact against the same party, the prosecutor. The
unique context of the Belcher case, rather than the prosecutor’s crossdesignation, may have played a substantive role in the court’s search for an
equitable outcome. The sovereign, rather than the individual prosecutor, is
typically considered the litigating party in criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the fundamental principles underlying the outcome justified
the remedy in Belcher and can be found in contexts giving rise to legitimate

262. See Murchison, supra note 257, at 413 (collecting statutes).
263. In 1975, a proposal for federal legislation dealing with successive prosecutions in
the federal system failed because it was thought that the Petite Policy adequately dealt with
the problem. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 100, at 722.
264. See Murchison, supra note 257.
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grounds for barring a simultaneous or successive prosecution by the same
prosecutor.265
VI. Conclusion
Our criminal justice system places an increasingly strong emphasis on
crime control and prevention at the expense of the fundamental fairness that
the Constitution affords criminal defendants. Uncontrolled discretion in the
hands of a powerful government official has great potential for abuse. In the
hands of cross-designated prosecutors, this potential often becomes a
reality. Courts have been unwilling to systematically rein in the prosecutors,
which has resulted in a decline in the fairness of the criminal justice system.
Considering the justifications for cross-designated prosecutors—namely
efficiency—in light of the extensive burden on the accused, one should
question the continued propriety of this system of centralized prosecution.
Addressing this problem and implementing measures to curtail its practice
will afford criminal defendants protection from abuses of prosecutorial
power and manipulation of the criminal process.

265. See Braun, supra note 4, at 73–74 (calling for an exception to the dual sovereignty
doctrine where the federal and state governments cooperate at the investigative or
prosecutorial stages of the criminal process).

